Cases - Ohio

In City of Xenia v. Diaz, 2003 WL 22972039 (Ohio App. December 19, 2003) the court treated a cash deposit made by a third party as a cash bond by the defendant and not as a surety bond.  The defendant was subject to an INS detainer, and even though bond was posted he never was released from custody.  It appears the City did not try to have him returned for trial.  The court held that the appellant who furnished the cash was not entitled to the statutory pre-forfeiture notice and an opportunity to show why the bond should not be forfeited which a surety would have been entitled to receive.  It held, however, that he was entitled to a post forfeiture hearing to try to show that performance of the obligation was impossible (i.e., that the defendant was in federal custody).  This case ought to give pause to anyone considering posting cash bail instead of a surety recognizance in Ohio.  It is clear that the procedural protections extended to the surety will be lost if cash bail is provided.

In State v. Delgado, 2004 WL 41404 (Ohio App. January 9, 2004) the trial court granted two extensions of time for the bail bond surety to apprehend the defendant but refused to remit any portion of the forfeiture when the defendant was returned shortly after forfeiture.  The trial court's only reasoning was that the nature of the surety's business was to assume the risk that the defendant would not appear.  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded holding that the trial court had to consider a number of factors including the delay and cost to the state in obtaining the defendant and preparing for trial a second time, the surety's efforts to return the defendant, and any other factors the court finds to be relevant.  The trial court has discretion but must exercise it in light of the purpose of bail to assure that the defendant appears at all stages of the proceeding.

In State v. Hardin, 2003 WL 23167301 (Ohio App. December 31, 2003) motions for remission of bond forfeitures were filed without requesting a hearing or setting forth any factual basis for relief.  The trial court denied the motions without a hearing.  The court of appeals affirmed, in a 2-1 decision, even though there was no basis in the record to review whether the trial court considered the various factors governing requests for remission of forfeiture.  If the sureties had asked for a hearing and alleged facts entitling them to relief, the opinion suggests they would have been entitled to a hearing.

Jones v. Bea, 2004 WL 442876 (Ohio App. March 12, 2004) is a very strange case.  The defendant’s father testified he obtained a $15,205 cashiers check payable to the Clerk of Court to pay a 10% cash bond plus fees to the clerk (he would have been liable for the balance of the $120,000 bond if his son failed to appear) but the bail agent waylaid him at the clerk’s office and insisted on signing the bond for the balance as surety, and they agreed that when the $15,000 was returned the bail agent would give the father $8,000 of the $15,000 and keep the rest as his fee.  The defendant did not appear for sentencing and the bond was forfeited.  The father then sued the bail agent for converting the cashiers check and won.  The Court of Appeals reversed and held that since there was no refund there was no obligation to return anything.

In State v. Harshman, 2004 WL 491410 (Ohio App. March 15, 2004) the trial court ordered that cash bail deposited by the defendant and his mother be applied to court costs and restitution.  The Court of Appeals held that this was improper.  The Court first noted that the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the purpose of bail is the appearance of the defendant and reasons for forfeiture must be related to nonappearance.  The State argued that the form signed when the bail was deposited consented to its application to costs and restitution, but the Court held that the consent was invalid because the availability of bail was conditioned on signing the form.

In State v. Rich, 2004 WL 2390085 (Ohio App. October 22, 2004) the surety (Capital Bonding Corp.) appealed denial of its motions to remit bond forfeitures in two cases in which it surrendered the defendants after forfeiture was entered.  In the two cases the trial court made identical findings, including that the surety was negligent in writing the bond because the defendant had failed to appear on prior occasions.  The Court of Appeals first held that the 30 day period to appeal ran from the date the clerk entered the defendant's sentence, not the date the bond was forfeited or the date the motion for remission was denied.  The Court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in one of the cases because the record supported its findings but that in the other case there was no evidence the defendant had failed to appear on a prior occasion or that the state was inconvenienced by the failure to appear.  In the latter case, the Court reversed and remanded for a determination of how much of the forfeiture should be remitted.

State v. Owens, 2004 WL 2526412 (Ohio App. November 9, 2004) held that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering forfeiture of the defendant's cash bond.  The trial court failed to consider the brief delay between the defendant's breach and her voluntary appearance and the lack of any cost or inconvenience to the state.  Rather than remand for consideration in light of these factors, however, the Court of Appeals directed that the bond money be released.

In Maloney v. Ohio Department of Insurance, 2004 WL 2590952 (Ohio App. October 4, 2004) the Court affirmed the Department's denial of a bail bondsman's license to a convicted felon.  Ohio R.C. 3905.14 specifically provides that the superintendent of insurance may deny an application based on such a conviction, and there was no abuse of discretion in doing so in this case.

In City of Willoughby v. Beckwith, 2005 WL 880220 (Ohio App. April 15, 2005) the surety filed a motion to vacate forfeiture of its bond and a motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to vacate.  It then appealed denial of the motion for reconsideration.  The Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the surety could have appealed the original order of forfeiture or the order denying its motion to vacate the forfeiture, but that a motion for reconsideration of a final order, and any decision on such a motion, are nullities from which no appeal can be taken.  Therefore, the appeal was untimely and was dismissed.